Georg W.F. Hegel: Moralität und moralische Weltanschauung (German Edition)
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But that eleventh axiom regarding parallel lines is a synthetic proposition a priori , and as such has the guarantee of pure, not empirical, perception; this perception is just as immediate and certain as is the principle of contradiction itself, from which all proofs originally derive their certainty. At bottom this holds good of every geometrical theorem Although Schopenhauer could see no justification for trying to prove Euclid's parallel postulate, he did see a reason for examining another of Euclid's axioms. It surprises me that the eighth axiom,  "Figures that coincide with one another are equal to one another", is not rather attacked.
For "coinciding with one another" is either a mere tautology , or something quite empirical , belonging not to pure intuition or perception, but to external sensuous experience. Thus it presupposes mobility of the figures, but matter alone is movable in space. Consequently, this reference to coincidence with one another forsakes pure space, the sole element of geometry , in order to pass over to the material and empirical. This follows Kant 's reasoning. The task of ethics is not to prescribe moral actions that ought to be done, but to investigate moral actions. Philosophy is always theoretical: According to Kant's teaching of transcendental idealism, space and time are forms of our sensibility due to which the phenomena appear in multiplicity.
Reality in itself is free from all multiplicity, not in the sense that an object is one, but that it is outside the possibility of multiplicity. From this follows that two individuals, though they appear as distinct, are in-themselves not distinct. The appearances are entirely subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason. The egoistic individual who focuses his aims completely on his own interests has therefore to deal with empirical laws as good as he can. What is relevant for ethics are individuals who can act against their own self-interest.
If we take for example a man who suffers when he sees his fellow men living in poverty, and consequently uses a significant part of his income to support their needs instead his own pleasures, then the simplest way to describe this is that he makes less distinction between himself and others than is usually made. Regarding how the things appear to us, the egoist is right to assert the gap between two individuals, but the altruist experiences the sufferings of others as his own.
In the same way a compassionate man cannot hurt animals, though they appear as distinct from himself. What motivates the altruist is compassion. The sufferings of others is for him not a cold matter to which he is indifferent, but he feels connected to all beings. Compassion is thus the basis of morality. Schopenhauer calls the principle through which multiplicity appears the principium individuationis. When we behold nature we see that it is a cruel battle for existence.
Individual manifestations of the will can maintain themselves at only at the expense of others—the will, as the only thing that exists, has no other option but to devour itself to experience pleasure. This is a fundamental characteristic of the will, and cannot be circumvented. Tormenter and tormented are one. Suffering is the moral retribution of our attachment to pleasure. Schopenhauer deemed that this truth was expressed by Christian dogma of original sin and in Eastern religions with the dogma of rebirth.
He who sees through the principium individuationis and comprehends suffering in general as his own, will see suffering everywhere, and instead of using all his force to fight for the happiness of his individual manifestation, he will abhor life itself, of which he knows how inseparably it is connected with suffering. A happy individual life midst of a world of suffering is for him like beggar who dreams one night that he is a king.
Those who have experienced this intuitive knowledge can no longer affirm life, but will exhibit asceticism and quietism, meaning that they are no longer sensitive to motives, are not concerned about their individual welfare, and accept the evil others inflict on them without resisting. They welcome poverty, do not seek nor flee death. Human life is a ceaseless struggle for satisfaction, and instead of renewing this contract, the ascetic breaks it. It matters little whether these ascetics adhered the dogmata of Christianity or Dharmic religions , since their way of living is the result of intuitive knowledge.
The Christian mystic and the teacher of the Vedanta philosophy agree in this respect also, they both regard all outward works and religious exercises as superfluous for him who has attained to perfection. So much agreement in the case of such different ages and nations is a practical proof that what is expressed here is not, as optimistic dullness likes to assert, an eccentricity and perversity of the mind, but an essential side of human nature, which only appears so rarely because of its excellence.
Philosophers have not traditionally been impressed by the tribulations of sex, but Schopenhauer addressed it and related concepts forthrightly:. He named a force within man that he felt took invariable precedence over reason: Schopenhauer refused to conceive of love as either trifling or accidental, but rather understood it as an immensely powerful force that lay unseen within man's psyche , guaranteeing the quality of the human race:. The ultimate aim of all love affairs What is decided by it is nothing less than the composition of the next generation It has often been argued that Schopenhauer's thoughts on sexuality foreshadowed the theory of evolution , a claim which seems to have been met with satisfaction by Darwin as he included a quote of the German philosopher in his Descent of Man after having read such a claim.
Schopenhauer's politics were, for the most part, an echo of his system of ethics the latter being expressed in Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik , available in English as two separate books, On the Basis of Morality and On the Freedom of the Will. Ethics also occupies about one quarter of his central work, The World as Will and Representation. In occasional political comments in his Parerga and Paralipomena and Manuscript Remains , Schopenhauer described himself as a proponent of limited government. What was essential, he thought, was that the state should "leave each man free to work out his own salvation ," and so long as government was thus limited, he would "prefer to be ruled by a lion than one of [his] fellow rats"—i.
Schopenhauer shared the view of Thomas Hobbes on the necessity of the state, and of state action, to check the destructive tendencies innate to our species. He also defended the independence of the legislative, judicial and executive branches of power, and a monarch as an impartial element able to practise justice in a practical and everyday sense, not a cosmological one.
Schopenhauer, by his own admission, did not give much thought to politics, and several times he writes proudly of how little attention he had paid "to political affairs of [his] day". In a life that spanned several revolutions in French and German government, and a few continent-shaking wars, he did indeed maintain his aloof position of "minding not the times but the eternities".
He wrote many disparaging remarks about Germany and the Germans. A typical example is, "For a German it is even good to have somewhat lengthy words in his mouth, for he thinks slowly, and they give him time to reflect. Schopenhauer attributed civilizational primacy to the northern "white races" due to their sensitivity and creativity except for the ancient Egyptians and Hindus, whom he saw as equal:. The highest civilization and culture, apart from the ancient Hindus and Egyptians, are found exclusively among the white races; and even with many dark peoples, the ruling caste or race is fairer in colour than the rest and has, therefore, evidently immigrated, for example, the Brahmans, the Incas, and the rulers of the South Sea Islands.
All this is due to the fact that necessity is the mother of invention because those tribes that emigrated early to the north, and there gradually became white, had to develop all their intellectual powers and invent and perfect all the arts in their struggle with need, want and misery, which in their many forms were brought about by the climate. This they had to do in order to make up for the parsimony of nature and out of it all came their high civilization.
Despite this, he was adamantly against differing treatment of races, was fervently anti-slavery, and supported the abolitionist movement in the United States. He describes the treatment of "[our] innocent black brothers whom force and injustice have delivered into [the slave-master's] devilish clutches" as "belonging to the blackest pages of mankind's criminal record".
Schopenhauer additionally maintained a marked metaphysical and political anti-Judaism. Schopenhauer argued that Christianity constituted a revolt against what he styled the materialistic basis of Judaism, exhibiting an Indian-influenced ethics reflecting the Aryan - Vedic theme of spiritual self-conquest. He saw this as opposed to what he held was the ignorant drive toward earthly utopianism and superficiality of a worldly "Jewish" spirit:. While all other religions endeavor to explain to the people by symbols the metaphysical significance of life, the religion of the Jews is entirely immanent and furnishes nothing but a mere war-cry in the struggle with other nations.
The State, Schopenhauer claimed, punishes criminals to prevent future crimes. It does so by placing "beside every possible motive for committing a wrong a more powerful motive for leaving it undone, in the inescapable punishment. Accordingly, the criminal code is as complete a register as possible of counter-motives to all criminal actions that can possibly be imagined In Schopenhauer's essay On Women , he expressed his opposition to what he called "Teutonico-Christian stupidity" of reflexive unexamined reverence "abgeschmackten Weiberveneration"  for the female.
Schopenhauer wrote that "Women are directly fitted for acting as the nurses and teachers of our early childhood by the fact that they are themselves childish, frivolous and short-sighted. He claimed that "woman is by nature meant to obey". The essay does give some compliments, however: Schopenhauer's writings have influenced many, from Friedrich Nietzsche to nineteenth-century feminists.
When the elderly Schopenhauer sat for a sculpture portrait by the Prussian sculptor Elisabet Ney in , he was much impressed by the young woman's wit and independence, as well as by her skill as a visual artist. I believe that if a woman succeeds in withdrawing from the mass, or rather raising herself above the mass, she grows ceaselessly and more than a man. Schopenhauer viewed personality and intellect as being inherited. He quotes Horace's saying, "From the brave and good are the brave descended" Odes , iv, 4, 29 and Shakespeare's line from Cymbeline , "Cowards father cowards, and base things sire base" IV, 2 to reinforce his hereditarian argument.
For Schopenhauer the "final aim of all love intrigues, be they comic or tragic, is really of more importance than all other ends in human life. What it all turns upon is nothing less than the composition of the next generation. It is not the weal or woe of any one individual, but that of the human race to come, which is here at stake. With our knowledge of the complete unalterability both of character and of mental faculties, we are led to the view that a real and thorough improvement of the human race might be reached not so much from outside as from within, not so much by theory and instruction as rather by the path of generation.
Plato had something of the kind in mind when, in the fifth book of his Republic , he explained his plan for increasing and improving his warrior caste. If we could castrate all scoundrels and stick all stupid geese in a convent, and give men of noble character a whole harem , and procure men, and indeed thorough men, for all girls of intellect and understanding, then a generation would soon arise which would produce a better age than that of Pericles.
In another context, Schopenhauer reiterated his eugenic thesis: This proposal constitutes my Utopia and my Platonic Republic. As a consequence of his monistic philosophy, Schopenhauer was very concerned about the welfare of animals. The word "will" designated, for him, force, power, impulse, energy, and desire; it is the closest word we have that can signify both the real essence of all external things and also our own direct, inner experience. Since every living thing possesses will, then humans and animals are fundamentally the same and can recognize themselves in each other.
Compassion for animals is intimately associated with goodness of character, and it may be confidently asserted that he who is cruel to living creatures cannot be a good man. Nothing leads more definitely to a recognition of the identity of the essential nature in animal and human phenomena than a study of zoology and anatomy. The assumption that animals are without rights and the illusion that our treatment of them has no moral significance is a positively outrageous example of Western crudity and barbarity.
Universal compassion is the only guarantee of morality. Schopenhauer even went so far as to protest against the use of the pronoun "it" in reference to animals because it led to the treatment of them as though they were inanimate things. He was very attached to his succession of pet poodles.
Schopenhauer criticized Spinoza's  belief that animals are a mere means for the satisfaction of humans. In the third, expanded edition of The World as Will and Representation , Schopenhauer added an appendix to his chapter on the Metaphysics of Sexual Love. He wrote that pederasty did have the benefit of preventing ill-begotten children. Concerning this, he stated that "the vice we are considering appears to work directly against the aims and ends of nature, and that in a matter that is all important and of the greatest concern to her it must in fact serve these very aims, although only indirectly, as a means for preventing greater evils".
I have done so by giving them the opportunity of slandering me by saying that I defend and commend pederasty.
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He was so impressed by their philosophy that he called them "the production of the highest human wisdom", and believed they contained superhuman concepts. The Upanishads was a great source of inspiration to Schopenhauer. Writing about them, he said:. It is the most satisfying and elevating reading with the exception of the original text which is possible in the world; it has been the solace of my life and will be the solace of my death. The book Oupnekhat Upanishad always lay open on his table, and he invariably studied it before sleeping at night.
He called the opening up of Sanskrit literature "the greatest gift of our century" and predicted that the philosophy and knowledge of the Upanishads would become the cherished faith of the West. Schopenhauer was first introduced to the Latin Upanishad translation through Friedrich Majer.
They met during the winter of — in Weimar at the home of Schopenhauer's mother according to the biographer Safranski. Majer was a follower of Herder , and an early Indologist. Schopenhauer did not begin a serious study of the Indic texts, however, until the summer of Sansfranski maintains that between and , Schopenhauer had another important cross-pollination with Indian thought in Dresden. This was through his neighbor of two years, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. Krause was then a minor and rather unorthodox philosopher who attempted to mix his own ideas with that of ancient Indian wisdom.
Krause had also mastered Sanskrit , unlike Schopenhauer, and the two developed a professional relationship. It was from Krause that Schopenhauer learned meditation and received the closest thing to expert advice concerning Indian thought. Schopenhauer noted a correspondence between his doctrines and the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism. Thus three of the four "truths of the Buddha" correspond to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will. For Schopenhauer, will had ontological primacy over the intellect. In other words, desire is prior to thought. If I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I should have to concede to Buddhism pre-eminence over the others.
In any case, it must be a pleasure to me to see my doctrine in such close agreement with a religion that the majority of men on earth hold as their own, for this numbers far more followers than any other. And this agreement must be yet the more pleasing to me, inasmuch as in my philosophizing I have certainly not been under its influence [emphasis added].
For up till , when my work appeared, there was to be found in Europe only a very few accounts of Buddhism. Buddhist philosopher Nishitani Keiji , however, sought to distance Buddhism from Schopenhauer. This actual world of what is knowable, in which we are and which is in us, remains both the material and the limit of our consideration. The argument that Buddhism affected Schopenhauer's philosophy more than any other Dharmic faith loses more credence when viewed in light of the fact that Schopenhauer did not begin a serious study of Buddhism until after the publication of The World as Will and Representation in They are included in a recent case study that traces Schopenhauer's interest in Buddhism and documents its influence.
Some traditions in Western esotericism and parapsychology interested Schopenhauer and influenced his philosophical theories. He praised animal magnetism as evidence for the reality of magic in his On the Will in Nature , and went so far as to accept the division of magic into left-hand and right-hand magic , although he doubted the existence of demons.
Schopenhauer grounded magic in the Will and claimed all forms of magical transformation depended on the human Will, not on ritual. This theory notably parallels Aleister Crowley 's system of magick and its emphasis on human will. Neoplatonism , including the traditions of Plotinus and to a lesser extent Marsilio Ficino , has also been cited as an influence on Schopenhauer.
In his student years Schopenhauer went more often to lectures in the sciences than philosophy. He kept a strong interest as his personal library contained near to books of scientific literature at his death, and his works refer to scientific titles not found in the library. Many evenings were spent in the theatre, opera and ballet; the operas of Mozart , Rossini and Bellini were especially esteemed. As a polyglot, the philosopher knew German , Italian , Spanish , French , English, Latin and ancient Greek , and he was an avid reader of poetry and literature.
If Goethe had not been sent into the world simultaneously with Kant in order to counterbalance him, so to speak, in the spirit of the age, the latter would have been haunted like a nightmare many an aspiring mind and would have oppressed it with great affliction. But now the two have an infinitely wholesome effect from opposite directions and will probably raise the German spirit to a height surpassing even that of antiquity. In philosophy, his most important influences were, according to himself, Kant, Plato and the Upanishads. If the reader has also received the benefit of the Vedas, the access to which by means of the Upanishads is in my eyes the greatest privilege which this still young century may claim before all previous centuries, if then the reader, I say, has received his initiation in primeval Indian wisdom, and received it with an open heart, he will be prepared in the very best way for hearing what I have to tell him.
It will not sound to him strange, as to many others, much less disagreeable; for I might, if it did not sound conceited, contend that every one of the detached statements which constitute the Upanishads, may be deduced as a necessary result from the fundamental thoughts which I have to enunciate, though those deductions themselves are by no means to be found there. Schopenhauer saw Bruno and Spinoza as unique philosophers who were not bound to their age or nation. Consequently, there is no place for God as creator of the world in their philosophy, but God is the world itself.
Schopenhauer expressed his regret that Spinoza stuck for the presentation of his philosophy with the concepts of scholasticism and Cartesian philosophy , and tried to use geometrical proofs that do not hold because of the vagueness and wideness of the definitions. It is the common preference of philosophers of abstraction over perception.
Bruno on the other hand, who knew much about nature and ancient literature, presents his ideas with Italian vividness, and is amongst philosophers the only one who comes near Plato's poetic and dramatic power of exposition. Schopenhauer noted that their philosophies do not provide any ethics, and it is therefore very remarkable that Spinoza called his main work Ethics.
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In fact, it could be considered complete from the standpoint of life-affirmation, if one completely ignores morality and self-denial. The importance of Kant for Schopenhauer, in philosophy as well as on a personal level, can hardly be overstated. The philosophy of Kant was the foundation of his own. Schopenhauer maintained that Kant stands in the same relation to philosophers such as Berkeley and Plato , as Copernicus to Hicetas , Philolaus , and Aristarchus: Kant succeeded in demonstrating what previous philosophers merely asserted.
In his study room one bust was of Buddha , the other was of Kant. Schopenhauer dedicated one fifth of his main work, The World as Will and Representation , to a criticism of the Kantian philosophy. The leading figures of post-Kantian philosophy , Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, were not respected by Schopenhauer. He argued that they were no philosophers at all, who merely sought to impress the public. But this can be conceived in a variety of ways: Predictably, problems will be revealed in these various different ways of thinking of the nature of those everyday objects of our experience. In fact, such collapse into a type of self-generated skepticism is typical of all the shapes we follow in the work, and there seems something inherently skeptical about such reflexive cognitive processes.
But this is not the type of skepticism that is typical of early modern philosophy, such as that used by Descartes in his attempt to find some foundation of indubitability on which genuine knowledge can be built Forster As is clear from his treatment of ancient philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy , Hegel was attracted to the type of dialectic employed by Socrates in his efforts to get his interlocutors thinking about something beyond that given immediately in sensation LHP II: For Hegel, the ancient skeptics captured the skeptical moment of thought that is the means by which thought progresses beyond the particular categories that have given rise to contradictions.
Just as in the way a new shape of thought, Perception, had been generated from the internal contradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, the collapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence of some new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergent attitude. In the case of Perception, the emergent new shape of consciousness, the Understanding, explored in Chapter 3, is a shape identified with the type of scientific cognition that, rather than remaining on the level of the perceived object, posits underlying forces involved in the production of the perceptual episode.
The transition from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, The Truth of Self-Certainty, also marks a more general transition from Consciousness to Self -consciousness. It is in the course of Chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most well-known part of the Phenomenology , the account of the struggle of recognition in which Hegel examines the inter-subjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of consciousness. Such complex patterns of mutual recognition constituting objective spirit thereby provide the social matrix within which individual self-consciousnesses can exist as such.
But this is only worked out in the text gradually. So we have to see how the protagonist self-consciousness could achieve this insight. It is to this end that we further trace the learning path of self-consciousness through the processes of reason in Chapter 5 before objective spirit can become the explicit subject matter of Chapter 6 Spirit.
Thus Hegel might be seen as adopting the viewpoint that since social life is ordered by customs we can approach the lives of those living in it in terms of the patterns of those customs or conventions themselves—the conventional practices, as it were, constituting specific, shareable forms of life made actual in the lives of particular individuals who had in turn internalized such general patterns in the process of acculturation.
It is not surprising then that his account of spirit here starts with a discussion of religious and civic law. But for non-traditionalists it is not obvious that Hegel, in employing such phrases, is in any way committed to any metaphysical supra-individual conscious being or beings. The idea seems to be that humans in society not only interact, but that they collectively create relatively enduring cultural products repeatable stories, stageable dramas, and so forth within which members of that society can recognise patterns of their own communal life as so reflected.
Furthermore, such cultural products themselves provide conditions allowing individuals to adopt particular cognitive attitudes by appropriating their resources. For Kant, the practical knowledge of morality, orienting one within the noumenal world, exceeds the scope of theoretical knowledge, which had been limited to phenomena. Hegel, however, thought that philosophy had to unify theoretical and practical knowledge, and so the Phenomenology has further to go. Again, this is seen differently by traditionalists and revisionists. Revisionists, on the other hand, tend to see Hegel as furthering the Kantian critique into the very coherence of a conception of an in-itself reality that is beyond the limits of our theoretical but not practical cognition.
However we understand this, absolute knowing is the standpoint to which Hegel has hoped to bring the reader in this complex work. For most of the 20 th century it was not received with the enthusiasm that often marked the reception of Phenomenology of Spirit. First, as a work of logic most have regarded it as radically outdated and relying on an Aristotelian approach that was definitively surpassed in the later nineteenth century—a view promoted especially by Bertrand Russell in the early years of the twentieth.
Recently, this skepticism has started to change. Some advocate that the Science of Logic be read as a first-order ontological doctrine Doz or as a category theory that simultaneously represents structures of being and thought Houlgate b , and so as having very little to do with what has traditionally been known as logic. In short, taking the logic as a category theory opens up two general lines of interpretation: Those, such as the advocates of the revised metaphysical interpretation, interpreting Hegel as basically a metaphysician, typically stress the former, while post-Kantian interpreters typically stress the latter.
A glance at the table of contents of Science of Logic reveals the same triadic structuring among the categories or thought determinations discussed that has been noted among the shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology. At the highest level of its branching structure there are the three books devoted to the doctrines of being, essence, and concept, while in turn, each book has three sections, each section containing three chapters, and so on.
In general, each of these individual nodes deals with some particular category. Reading into the first chapter of Book 1, Being, it is quickly seen that the transitions of the Logic broadly repeat those of the first chapters of the Phenomenology , now, however, as between the categories themselves rather than between conceptions of the respective objects of conscious experience. Thus, being is the thought determination with which the work commences because it at first seems to be the most immediate, fundamental determination that characterises any possible thought content at all.
Whatever thought is about, that topic must in some sense exist. Like those purported simple sensory givens with which the Phenomenology starts, the category being looks to have no internal structure or constituents, but again in a parallel to the Phenomenology , it is the effort of thought to make this category explicit that both undermines it and brings about new ones.
Being seems to be both immediate and simple, but it will show itself to be, in fact, only something in opposition to something else, nothing. The only way out of this paradox is to posit a third category within which they can coexist as negated Aufgehoben moments. This category is becoming , which saves thinking from paralysis because it accommodates both concepts. Becoming contains being and nothing in the sense that when something becomes it passes, as it were, from nothingness to being.
But these contents cannot be understood apart from their contributions to the overarching category: In general this is how the Logic proceeds: However, in turn the new category will generate some further contradictory negation and again the demand will arise for a further concept that can reconcile these opposed concepts by incorporating them as moments. It is in terms of this category that we can think, along with Aristotle, of a thing having an underlying substrate within which properties inhere and which, unlike the properties themselves, cannot be thought in general terms, but only in terms of the category of singularity.
And yet this will encounter a problem for the determinacy of this underlying substrate— it will have to find determining contrasts that allow it to be determinately conceived. In Book 2 of the Logic we will learn that the category of singularity will rely on particularity just as particularity has been shown to rely on singularlity.
Attempting to unravel the intricacies of the patterns of dependence between such categories will be task of this mammoth work, but here a general point might be made. Hegel only explicitly explores the details of the interactions of these determinations of conceptuality in his discussion of judgments and syllogisms in Book 3, The Doctrine of Concept, suggesting that concerns of logic as traditionally conceived are not as irrelevant to the Science of Logic as often thought.
However, the general point separating his approach from that of Spinoza clearly emerges earlier on. The other basic methodological principle of the Logic will be that this categorical infrastructure of thought is able to be unpacked using only the resources available to thought itself: For Kant, transcendental logic was the logic governing the thought of finite thinkers like ourselves, whose cognition was constrained by the necessity of applying general discursive concepts to the singular contents given in sensory intuitions, and he contrasted this with the thought of a type of thinker not so constrained—God—a thinker whose thought could directly grasp the world in a type of intellectual intuition.
It is also a science of actual content as well, and as such has an ontological dimension. Naturally the logical structures and processes implicit in essence-thinking are more developed than those of being-thinking. In contrast, the categories of Being-logic seem to govern thought processes that are restricted to qualitative phenomena and their co-ordinations.
But distinction between essence and appearance must itself instantiate the relation of determinate negation, and the metaphysical tendency to think of reality as made up of some underlying substrates in contrast to the superficial appearances will itself come to grief with the discovery that the notion of an essence is only meaningful in virtue of the appearance that it is meant to explain away.
In terms of the ultimate conceptual categories of singularity, particularity and universality, this discovery would be equivalent to grasping the idea that the singularity of the underlying, non-perceivable substrate or substantial form is meaningful only in relation to something that can bear the particular qualities that constitutes its worldly appearance. For Hegel it is the complex modern, but pre-Kantian, versions of substance metaphysics, like those of Spinoza and Leibniz, that bring out in the most developed way the inherently contradictory nature of this form of thought.
Book 3, The Doctrine of Concept, effects a shift from the Objective Logic of Books 1 and 2, to Subjective Logic, and metaphysically coincides with a shift to the modern subject-based category theory of Kant. Just as Kantian philosophy is founded on a conception of objectivity secured by conceptual coherence, Concept-logic commences with the concept of concept itself, with its moments of singularity, particularity and universality. While in the two books of objective logic, the movement had been between particular concepts, being, nothing, becoming etc.
S and P are thus meant 1 to be diverse, but 2 to form a unity—a situation we are now familiar with in terms of the Aufhebung of parts in a whole. Hegel takes this as signaling two ways of thinking of the relation of subject and predicate in the judgment. One can take subject and predicate terms as self-subsistent entities that are joined in the judgment, or one can take the judgment itself as the primary unit that splits into subject and predicate terms.
This in fact coincides with the two different ways in which logical relations have been conceived in the history of philosophy: From the former point of view one thinks of the subject term as designating a substance, typically grasped as an instance of a kind, in which properties, designated by predicate terms, inhere. From the latter point of view, one thinks of predicate terms as abstract universals that subsume or are satisfied by entities to which the subject terms refer, an approach which conceives of the propositional content, in Stoic terminology—the lecton , the what-is-said —as having a primacy over the parts.
Using a distinction from the Medievals, we can describe the first type of judgments as de re about things and the second as de dicto about sayings. These alternative joining and splitting approaches can in turn be applied to the relationship of judgments within inferences or syllogisms. In contrast with Kant, Hegel seems to go beyond a transcendental deduction of the formal conditions of experience and thought and to a deduction of their material conditions.
Such a psychologistic attitude was opposed by Hegel just as it was opposed by a figure as central to modern logic as Gottlob Frege. For Frege, thoughts are not mental, rather they are abstract entities like numbers, so the problem facing us is not how to go from mental contents to the concrete world, it is how to go from abstract to concrete ones. In fact Bertrand Russell had, at points in his career, entertained such an idea of propositional content itself.
Thus when Hegel characterizes some judgment structures typically perception based judgments as judgments of existence one might take the perceived thing itself as straightforwardly part of the content of the judgment. It is a concrete object, but not grasped as a concrete simple , but grasped in relation to what is judged of it in the predicate. And to the extent that judgments can be considered components of syllogisms, we might appreciate how syllogisms might have become contentful in a process that has culminated in the concrete syllogism of necessity.
In the Phenomenology it turned out that the capacity for a subject to entertain objects of consciousness such as perceptual ones was that such a subject was capable of self-consciousness. It then turned out that to be capable of self-consciousness the subject had to exist in a world with other embodied subjects whose intentions it could recognize. Formally considered we might think of this syllogism as the logical schematization of the most developed form of recognition in which thinkers acknowledge others as free thinkers.
What we see here is a reprise of the conception of logos as an objective process running through the world as had been conceived by the ancient Stoics and neo-Platonists. But it is now embedded not simply in the world as such—in nature —but in objectivized spirit , in human communities of thinkers. We are now returned to the domain of objectivity that had characterized Books 1 and 2 of the Science of Logic , but we might expect such a return from subjectivity to have effected a change in objectivity as earlier understood.
To cross straight into a consideration of the objectivity of the human world of action and thought—spirit—would be to break the developmental pattern of the logic because thought about such a complex form of objective existence will presuppose thought about simpler forms. And so the starting point for the consideration of objectivity will again be that of the simple object as something immediately grasped by thought.
But this object can now be developed with that elaborate conceptual apparatus that has emerged in the preceding section. This adequate concept is the Idea , which, after tracking through considerations of the living individual and theoretical and practical cognition, emerges as the Absolute Idea. The first part of the Encyclopaedia is essentially a condensed version of his earlier Science of Logic , considered above. Was not Hegel simply trying to pre-empt the work of empirical scientists by somehow attempting to anticipate the very contents of their discoveries from logical considerations alone?
Krug is mentioned explicitly in a footnote at this point. In these sciences the empirical element is the sole confirmation of the hypothesis, so that everything has to be explained. In keeping with the more general idea that that philosophy attempts to discern or recognize concepts in representations Vorstellungen or empirical appearances, philosophy of nature investigates the conceptual structures that are manifest in the products of the scientific work that is done on the basis of those appearances. Traces of conceptual determination will certainly survive in the most particularized product, although they will not exhaust its nature.
Clearly, philosophy of nature is not in competition with the empirical natural sciences; it takes as its subject matter the results of those sciences in order to discover within them the particular ways in which the necessary categorial structures deduced in the logic are expressed. In terms of topics treated, the Philosophy of Nature largely coincides with those treated in the third book of the Science of Logic when the logical processes and relations in question have returned to objectivity after the excursion into the subjectivity of formal logic at the outset of Book 3.
In Mechanism Hegel had reconstructed a movement in thought from a primitive cosmology in which all objects are conceived in relation to a central object the sun that exemplifies objecthood per se , to a system of objects within which any such self-sufficient center has been eliminated. In this Newtonian world, that which gives order to the whole now has the ideality of law, but this is itself thought of as external to the system of objects. After an Introduction, Section One of the Philosophy of Nature , Mechanics, expands on this progression through considerations of space and time, matter considered as the diversity of individual bodies distributed in space and time, and finally the idea of universal gravitation as the determinate concept of such corporeal matter realized as idea PN: In the Newtonian laws of mechanics, however, the unity of matter is still only formal , and in Section Two, Physics, the determinateness of form is now considered as immanent within such corporeal matter.
Matter has individuality to the extent that it is determined within itself by having being-for-self developed within it. It is through this determination that matter breaks away from gravity and manifests itself as implicitly self-determining. While Mechanics clearly reflects the more space-filling conception of matter dominant in British thought, Physics is consistent with the more dynamic continental European conception of matter originating in Leibniz with his idea of living forces.
Within this framework, Hegel attempts to organize a vast array of areas of contemporary physical investigation including meteorology, theories of sound and heat, light and electricity up to and including chemical processes which stand on the threshold of Organic Physics, dealt with in Section Three.
From such a conception, the first body to be considered is that of the earth itself , along with its history. Chapter Two moves to a consideration of the plant and Chapter Three, the animal organism. From the point of view of the actual content of scientific theories and approaches that Hegel summarizes and locates within his system, his Philosophy of Nature is clearly a product of his time. Nevertheless, many of the underlying philosophical issues dealt with are still now far from settled. Within subjective spirit, we may anticipate that the first division, Anthropology, will follow on from topics with which Philosophy of Nature ends—the animal organism—and so it does.
If soul and body are absolutely opposed to one another as is maintained by the abstractive intellectual consciousness,. The community was, however, recognized by ancient metaphysics as an undeniable fact. The Seele of Anthropology should therefore not be confused with the modern subjective conception of mind, as exemplified by Descartes and other early modern philosophers. Aristotle had conceived of the soul as the form of the body, not as a substance separate from that of the body, and had attributed lesser souls to animals and even plants.
Concomitantly, in this section Hegel describes spirit as sunk in nature, and treats consciousness as largely limited to what now might be described as sentient or phenomenal consciousness alone—the feeling soul. Consciousness in the sense of the modern subject—object opposition only makes its appearance in the following second section, Phenomenology of Spirit, which, reprising key moments from the earlier book of that name, raises a problem for how we are to understand the relation of phenomenology and systematic philosophy: Given that the recognitive approach to self-consciousness presupposes that potential self-consciousnesses are in fact embodied and located in the world, we would expect the mind as treated in Psychology to be no less embodied as the way in which it is conceived in Anthropology.
What in fact distinguishes the mind of Psychology from that of Anthropology is its rational capacities, considered in terms that would now be described as normative rather than simply naturalistic, and this for Hegel clearly signals a difference in the way in which an actual psychological subject relates to his or her own body. The type of abstractive thinking found in Psychology does not, of course, as in mythical images of metempsychosis—a favorite trope of Platonists—involve the mind leaving the body.
This would count for Hegel as a piece of mythical picture thinking—a Vorstellung. Rather, it involves a certain capacity of the psychological subject to suspend unreflected-upon endorsement of the claims made on behalf of his or her body, for example, to subject the evidence given by the senses to rational scrutiny. In this sense, we are witnessing within another mode, the type of progression seen in the movement in Phenomenology from shapes of consciousness to shapes of spirit.
The internal Phenomenology of Spirit seems to play an important role in setting up this transition from Psychology to Objective Spirit Williams , but it might also be seen as crucial in relating the more cognitive dimensions of Psychology back to the theme of embodiment prominent in Anthropology Nuzzo a. Thus any naturalistic analysis is ultimately surpassed by a social and historical one, which itself cannot be understood as anti -naturalistic. The philosophy of subjective spirit passes over into that of objective spirit, which concerns the objective patterns of social interaction and the cultural institutions within which spirit is objectified.
The Philosophy of Right as it is more commonly called can be read as a political philosophy that stands independently of the system Tunick , despite the fact that Hegel intended it to be read against the background of the developing conceptual determinations of the Logic. The text proper starts from the conception of a singular willing subject grasped from the point of view of its individual self-consciousness as the bearer of abstract right. While this conception of the individual willing subject possessing some kind of fundamental rights was in fact the starting point of many modern political philosophies such as that of Locke, for example the fact that Hegel commences here does not testify to any ontological assumption that the consciously willing and right-bearing individual is the basic atom from which all society can be understood as constructed—an idea at the heart of standard social contract theories.
Just as the categories of the Logic develop in a way meant to demonstrate that what had at the start been conceived as simple is in fact only made determinate in virtue of its being a functional part of some larger structure or process, here too it is meant to be shown that any simple willing and right-bearing subject only gains its determinacy in virtue of a place it finds for itself in a larger social, and ultimately historical, structure or process.
Thus, even a contractual exchange the minimal social interaction for contract theorists is not to be thought simply as an occurrence consequent upon the existence of two beings with natural animal wants and some natural calculative rationality, as in Hobbes, say; rather, the system of interaction within which individual exchanges take place the economy will be treated holistically as a culturally-shaped form of social life within which the actual wants of individuals as well as their reasoning powers are given determinate forms. Hegel is well aware of the distinctive modernity of this form of social-life.
Here too it becomes apparent that Hegel, taking up themes from the Phenomenology, follows Fichte in treating property in terms of a recognitive analysis of the nature of such a right. A contractual exchange of commodities between two individuals itself involves an implicit act of recognition in as much as each, in giving something to the other in exchange for what they want, is thereby recognizing that other as a proprietor of that thing, or, more properly, of the inalienable value attaching to it PR: Such an interactive constitution of the common will means that for Hegel that the identity among wills is achieved because of not in spite of co-existing differences between the particular wills of the subjects involved: Each wants something different from the exchange.
Hegel passes from the abstractly individualistic frame of Abstract Right to the social determinacies of Sittlichkeit or Ethical Life PR: In punishing the criminal the state makes it clear to its members that it is the acknowledgment of right per se that is essential to developed social life: Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. August Learn how and when to remove this template message. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel bibliography. Luther, Hegel's Critique of Modernity: Sarlemijn, Hegel's Dialectic , Springer, , p.
In short, he adopts a view very similar to Kant's empirical realism. An Illustrated Biography , Pegasus, , p. Luft, Hegel's Shorter Logic: An Introduction and Commentary , Gegensatz Press, , p. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts , Vorrede: II, Meiner, , pp. The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism. After the Fall of Communism. University of Wales Press. Journal of the History of Economic Thought. Hegelian reflections in twentieth-century France. The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It does not occur anywhere in The Science of Logic though he comes close in a remark on p. Greraets, Suchting and Harris note in the introduction to their translation of this later text that the term is more strongly associated with English movement in that later part of the 19th century Hackett: In Breazeale, Daniel; Fichte, Johann Jahrhundert , Harper, A Biography , p. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. A Search for Unity in Diversity: Archived from the original PDF on The letter was not published in Hegel's time, but the expression was attributed to Hegel anecdotally, appearing in print from L.
Noack, Schelling und die Philosophie der Romantik , , p. It is used without attribution by Meyer Kayserling in his Sephardim The phrase become widely associated with Hegel later in the 19th century, e. October , p. Hegel, letter of 13 October to F. Hegel aus heutiger Sicht , Wilhelm Fink Verlag , p. A History , , p. Miller [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Between Freedom and Necessity: An Essay on the Place of Value. An Introduction to Hegel's Logic. A History of Philosophy: Continuum International Publishing Group. Krug", Kritisches Journal der Philosophie , I, no.
Vickroy and Susan E. Blow - who were both minor associates of the St. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy in print from was the official journal of the St. Louis Philosophical Society - the organization which served as the hub of the St. Susan Elizabeth Blow June 7, - March 27, was an educator who in opened the first successful public kindergarten in the U. The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences. University of Chicago Press. Kaufmann , Discovery of the Mind 1: Goethe, Kant and Hegel , p.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Kaufmann , Hegel: A Reinterpretation , Anchor, p. A Reinterpretation , p. Columbia University Press, The Hegel Myths and Legends. Francis Fukuyama and the End of History. Russell, History of Western Philosophy , chapter 22, paragraph 1, p. Selected writings , p. The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness Cambridge: A History of Western Philosophy. Routledge, , Instead, I argue that we must understand Hegel as a Hermetic thinker, if we are to truly understand him at all.
The Logic of Hegel's Logic: An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History. Blackwell Houlgate, Stephen, The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity. Northwestern University Press, Inwood, Michael , Kaufmann, Walter , Doubleday reissued Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit , Basic Books, Losurdo, Domenico , Hegel and the Freedom of Moderns. State University of New York Press. Marcuse, Herbert , Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Mueller, Gustav Emil , Pinkard, Terry , The Explanation of Possibility.
Temple University Press Pinkard, Terry , The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge and New York: Plant, Raymond , Blackwell Riedel, Manfred , Between Tradition and Revolution: Rose, Gillian , Cambridge University Press Singer, Peter , A Very Short Introduction. In the Spirit of Hegel , Oxford: Oxford University Press Stern, Robert The Routledge guide book to Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit second ed. Abingdon, Oxon New York: The Philosophy of Hegel. Taylor, Charles , Articles related to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
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